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Sample NextGen UBE Legal Research Performance Task 2

A legal research performance task (LRPT) focuses on legal research and analysis skills. It consists of multiple-choice and short-answer questions followed by a medium-length writing assignment.

LRPTs may assess skills through subject areas that are partially or fully outside of the Foundational Concepts and Principles; however, the question will provide the resources the examinee needs to give a complete answer. For example, an LRPT may include aspects of state Trusts and Estates law when assessing research and writing skills, but the library will provide all Trusts and Estates law necessary to give a complete answer.

For additional information on performance tasks, visit About Performance Tasks. 

The following is a sample legal research performance task, comprised of four multiple-choice questions, one short-answer question, and one medium-length writing assignment. It should take approximately 60 minutes to complete.

Sample Legal Research Performance Task 2

Learner’s Permit—Legal Research Performance Task

Component 1

Section 7-29(d) of the Franklin Transportation Code provides that a permitted driver may operate a vehicle when accompanied by an “immediate family member” who is 18 years of age or older.

You want to determine whether Sarah, as Michelle’s cousin, qualifies as an “immediate family member.” You conduct a search of that term within a legal research database and find the following sources.

Which sources’ definitions of the term would be binding on this matter?

Select two response options.

A. Franklin Court of Appeal opinion that interprets Franklin Transportation Code § 7-29.

B. Franklin District Court opinion that interprets Franklin Transportation Code § 7-29.

C. Franklin Law Dictionary.

D. Franklin Practice Guide that interprets Franklin Transportation Code § 7-29.

E. Franklin Supreme Court opinion that interprets a provision from the Franklin Family Code.

F. Franklin Transportation Code’s “Definitions” section.

Component 1 Answer

Solution: The correct answers are A and F.

Answer A is correct. The Franklin Court of Appeal is a court of supervisory jurisdiction in Franklin, and it has the power to interpret Franklin statutory law. Its definition of the term “immediate family member” in § 7-29 would be binding in this matter.

Answer F is correct. The Franklin legislature’s definition of a term within the same statutory code is binding.

Answer B is incorrect. The Franklin District Court is not a court of supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, it does not have the power to create binding precedent in Franklin.

Answer C is incorrect. The Franklin Law Dictionary is a secondary source that cannot provide binding definitions of law.

Answer D is incorrect. The Franklin Practice Guide is a secondary source that cannot provide binding definitions of law.

Answer E is incorrect. The Franklin Supreme Court’s interpretation of a different statutory code would not be binding.

Component 2

Review § 7-29 of the Franklin Transportation Code.

In her interview, Michelle stated that her cousin, Sarah, was resting in the back seat of the vehicle immediately before the collision.

List two specific, distinct reasons why this conduct violates § 7-29.

Provide one answer in each answer field. The length of each answer should be about one sentence.

Component 2 Representative Correct Answers

  • Sarah was not occupying a seat beside the driver.
  • Sarah was not alert.
  • Sarah was not able to assist Michelle.

Component 3

The following text appears in Frederick v. Jones (Franklin Ct. App. 2023):

The plaintiff . . . refers to a Franklin Law Review article that states, “A driver who operates a vehicle on the roadways with a learner’s permit is a liability to other drivers. The driver’s inexperience may deem him ‘unfit.’” The Inherent Hazards of Young Drivers, Franklin Law Review.

Was the Frederick court bound by the article’s assertion that a driver’s inexperience may deem him “unfit”?

Select one response option.

A. No, because although the language in a law review article is normally binding, the Frederick court chose not to adopt it.

B. No, because the article is a secondary source.

C. Yes, because the article is a Franklin-issued source.

D. Yes, because the article is a persuasive authority.

Component 3 Answer

Solution: The correct answer is B.

Answer B is correct. A law review article is a secondary source rather than a primary source. Therefore, it is not binding.

Answer A is incorrect. A law review article is a secondary source, so its language is not binding.

Answer C is incorrect. Although the law review article is from the Franklin Law Review, it is a secondary source and therefore not binding.

Answer D is incorrect. Although it correctly states that the law review article is a persuasive authority (rather than a mandatory authority), a persuasive authority is not binding.

Component 4

Which of the following facts were dispositive to the decision in Frederick v. Jones (Franklin Ct. App. 2023) to reverse the trial court’s ruling?

Select two response options.

A. The 15-year-old driver was at fault in the collision.

B. The accompanying passenger owned the vehicle involved in the collision.

C. The accompanying passenger was 22 years old.

D. The accompanying passenger was the 15-year-old driver’s friend and not an “immediate family member.”

E. The complaint did not allege that the 15-year-old driver was under the influence of alcohol.

F. There was no allegation that the 15-year-old’s learner’s permit was restricted.

Component 4 Answer

Solution: The correct answers are E and F.

Answer E is correct. The Franklin Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to include facts tending to show that the driver was “unfit.” Specifically, the court noted that “there is no allegation . . . that the driver was under the influence of . . . alcohol at the time of the accident” and that “[a]ccordingly, there are no allegations suggesting that the driver was ‘unfit.’” Therefore, the Court of Appeal determined that the plaintiff “failed to state a claim for negligent entrustment” and that the trial court “erred in denying the motion to dismiss as to negligent entrustment.”

Answer F is correct. The Franklin Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to include facts tending to show that the driver was “unfit.” Specifically, the court noted that the complaint “does not allege that the 15-year-old driver’s learner’s permit was restricted” and that “[a]ccordingly, there are no allegations suggesting that the driver was ‘unfit.’”

Answer A is incorrect. Whether the driver was at fault in the collision was not tied to whether she was “unfit” as a driver.

Answer B is incorrect. The identity of the vehicle’s owner was not tied to whether the driver was “unfit.”

Answer C is incorrect. The age of the accompanying passenger was not tied to whether the driver was “unfit.”

Answer D is incorrect. The classification of the accompanying passenger as something other than an “immediate family member” was not tied to whether the driver was “unfit.”

Component 5

If your supervising attorney files a motion to dismiss the negligent entrustment action on Sarah’s behalf, what must the attorney demonstrate to succeed on the motion?

Select one response option.

A. Samuel has not alleged sufficient facts of negligent entrustment such that relief may be granted.

B. The material facts are not in dispute, and the law applied to those facts shows a lack of negligent entrustment as a matter of law.

C. The negligent entrustment action fails under the de novo legal standard.

D. There is credible evidence demonstrating that Michelle was a cautious driver and therefore not “unfit.”

Component 5 Answer

Solution: The correct answer is A.

Answer A is correct. It includes the correct standard for a motion to dismiss. As stated in Frederick v. Jones, “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.”

Answer B is incorrect. The standard provided is relevant for a motion for summary judgment rather than for a motion to dismiss.

Answer C is incorrect. Appellate courts use the de novo standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. That standard is not used in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss.

Answer D is incorrect. The credibility of evidence is considered at trial, not at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Writing Assignment

You and your supervising attorney have discussed the general negligence claim against Michelle and have reviewed § 7-29 of the Franklin Transportation Code. You agree that Michelle’s decision to drive with Sarah as the accompanying passenger was a clear violation of § 7-29(e) because of Sarah’s suspended driver’s license.

Your supervisor has asked you whether evidence of Sarah’s suspended license would be admissible at trial on the issue of Michelle’s negligence.

Using the sources in your library, draft an email to your supervisor. In your email, objectively and thoroughly analyze whether such evidence would be admissible under Franklin law. Assume that the legal theories asserted in Samuel’s Complaint are the only legal theories that he will assert at trial.

Do not include a separate statement of facts, but be sure to refer to the relevant facts when preparing your analysis. Do not include a greeting or closing in the email; rather, focus only on the legal analysis needed to answer the legal question.

Writing Assignment Sample Answer Outline

Rules

  • The admissibility of evidence that a defendant violated a licensing statute is a question of law. Covington v. Hitchcock (Franklin Ct. App. 2009).
  • For such evidence to be admissible, there must be “a causal connection between the statutory violation and the injuries incurred.” Covington (quoting Valdez v. Carter (Franklin S. Ct. 2001)).
  • The violation of a licensing statute “may be admissible to show the driver’s inexperience and incompetence in handling an automobile” if the statutory violation was directly related to the cause of the accident. Covington v. Hitchcock (quoting Valdez).
    • Example of licensing violation evidence that was not admissible—Valdez v. Carter (Franklin S. Ct. 2001):
      • The defendant violated the learner’s permit statute by failing to be accompanied by a licensed passenger at the time of the accident.
      • The plaintiff’s theory of negligence was that the defendant caused the accident by speeding.
      • The Court held that there was no causal connection between the lack of supervision of a licensed passenger and the accident because the defendant’s speeding was the alleged cause of the accident, and the plaintiff did not allege that it was caused by a lack of the supervision required under § 7-29 of the Franklin Transportation Code.
      • Therefore, evidence of the licensing violation was inadmissible.
    • Example of licensing violation evidence that was admissible—Covington v. Hitchcock (Franklin Ct. App. 2009):
      • The plaintiff’s theory of negligence was that the defendant’s inexperience in driving, because he lacked a driver’s license, was a cause of the accident.
      • The plaintiff presented evidence in support of this theory that the defendant made a driving choice that experienced drivers would not have made.
      • The plaintiff’s “theory of liability connected the specific violation—the lack of a driver’s license and thus a lack of driving experience—to the cause of the accident.”
      • Therefore, evidence of the defendant’s lack of a driver’s license was admissible on the issue of the defendant’s negligence.

Application

  • Michelle violated the Franklin learner’s permit statute (§ 7-29) by driving with an accompanying passenger who did not hold a valid driver’s license.
  • However, Samuel’s theory of liability is that Michelle was impaired because she was under the influence of alcohol. He alleges that this impaired driving “resulted in her failure to stop in time to avoid hitting Mendez’s vehicle” and that this “was the actual and proximate cause of the collision and of Mendez’s injuries.”
  • Samuel’s theory of Michelle’s negligence is not connected to any deficiencies in supervision by her accompanying passenger. Thus, there is no causal connection between this statutory violation and Samuel’s injuries.
    • Analogy to Valdez:
      • Like in Valdez, in which the theory of negligence liability related to speeding rather than to deficiencies with an accompanying passenger, and therefore the licensing statute violation was not admissible, in this case, the theory of negligence is related to Michelle’s impaired driving. In both cases, there is no causal connection—and the plaintiffs alleged no causal connection—between the statutory violation and the injuries incurred by the plaintiff.
    • Distinction from Covington:
      • Covington’s facts differ from the facts of the current case because the theory of liability in Covington was directly related to the statutory violation of driving without a driver’s license. The plaintiff presented testimony that the driver’s inexperience, which was due to his lack of a driver’s license, caused him to make a driving decision that experienced drivers would not have made. For this reason, evidence of the licensing violation was admissible. There is no such connection in this case—Samuel does not allege that Michelle’s inexperience or lack of supervision caused her to make a driving decision that caused the accident. Rather, he alleges that her impaired driving from consuming alcohol was the cause of the accident.

Conclusion

  • Evidence of Sarah’s suspended license is likely not admissible on the issue of Michelle’s negligence.

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